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Introduction
Kenya efforts at combating corruption date back to the colonial period. Initial efforts at
addressing corruption merely focused on how best to define corrupt behavior and determining
how severely to punish offenders. In this period, an anti-corruption agency was not thought
necessary. Corruption was not regarded as a systemic and endemic problem, but rather as a
problem that could be resolved through discrete legislative amendments.

Later efforts aimed at combating corruption embraced the idea that an anticorruption agency was
a necessary component. This became clear at the apex of one party rule in the 1980’s which also
coincided with revelations of grand corruption. Initial anticorruption agencies were part of the
police force and lacked the independence, resources and legislative mandate to undertake their
tasks. The eventual establishment of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority in the late 1990s
with a legislative mandate was short-lived when the courts declared it unconstitutional in part
because the then Constitution only conferred prosecutorial powers on the Attorney General.
Thus, the rise of an anticorruption authority in the context of an authoritarian and corrupt
government was met with judicial disapproval. The entire government was corrupt.

3

Broader efforts at fighting corruption such as the enactment of the Public Officer’s Ethics Act in
2003 exemplify initiatives at promoting good governance in all its aspects – including the
establishment of a cabinet level Secretary in charge of Governance and Ethics and the
appointment of a former Transparency International (Kenya) Chair to the position; the
requirement that public officers declare their wealth. Another significant example of the broader
efforts designed to fight corruption was the effort to entrench the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission in the Constitution. Such entrenchment, it was argued, would insulate anticorruption investigations and prosecutions for violating other constitutional rules such as
separation of powers or the presumption of innocence. Significant amendments to anti-corruption
laws following the 2003 election of President Mwai Kibaki and appointment of credible anticorruption crusaders to lead the campaign were met with further pushback from Parliament and
leading politicians who hounded anticorruption crusaders like Mr. Githongo from office and
repeatedly declined to pass constitutional amendments to insulate the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission from judicial challenges for its unconstitutionality and its investigatory powers.

Grand scale corruption even after the election of a new President in 2002 who promised an end
to corruption has however almost come to naught – all three branches of government were
staffed with suspected corruption offenders, the country had an Attorney General unwilling to
prosecute high level corruption suspects and a judiciary keenly concerned about the abuse of the
procedural rights of those who were sought to be prosecuted than the broad goals of the anticorruption agenda. Resignations of government ministers suspected to have been involved in
high level corruption were followed by a return to government after investigatory commissions
white-washed the scandals.
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Anti-corruption efforts continue to be hobbled in the coalition government of President MwaiKibaki and Prime-Minister Raila Odinga that was formed in 2008. The August 2010 Constitution
provides new hope – it entrenches an Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, and enshrines the
principles of transparency, public officer ethics and accountability. The new Constitution of
Kenya overwhelmingly ratified in August 2010 is the latest glimpse of hope in Kenya’s
anticorruption journey. A constitutionally enshrined Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
will replace the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. Looking ahead, Parliament still retains the
authority to explicitly give such a Commission the authority to prosecute and one of the
challenges remains whether or not Parliament will do so or if it will continue the legacy of
capitalizing on lack of legal clarity about the powers of the most important anti-corruption
agency in the country. This paper examines Kenya’s efforts at combating corruption in a
historical context seen against the promise of the new Constitution and the lessons these efforts
have for other countries.

This paper is divided into five parts. In Part I, I discuss the origins of the anti-corruption
initiatives in the 1952 Prevention of Corruption Act. Part II fast forwards to 1991 when after
about five decades a new flurry of legislative activity started with the creation of the first
anticorruption institutions in the country. Part III analyzes the demise of the Kenyan AntiCorruption Authority indicating push back from the judiciary as politicians in one-party
authoritarian Kenya sought judicial cover against corruption charges. Part IV examines the
promising rise of a new government in 2002 elected on an anticorruption platform while Part V
details the extensive legislative changes that were enacted by the new government. Finally, Part
VI brings the anti-corruption agenda to date by examining the continuing challenges following
the enactment of a new Constitution in August 2010.
5

Part I: Initial Steps in the Fight against Corruption

A) The Passing of the Prevention of Corruption Bill, 1956 and the First Amendments

The first piece of anti-corruption legislation passed by the Kenyan Government was the
Prevention of Corruption Act in 1956. 1 At the time, Kenya was still a British Colony and would
be for another six years. The objective of this bill was to make it nearly certain that those who
engaged in corrupt practices were caught and punished. 2 It was thought that certainty of
detection would be a better deterrent than very harsh punishments for those found to be corrupt. 3
The Minister for Legal Affairs, Mr. Conroy, elucidated argued that “[I]t is no good enacting
Draconian laws, which impose exceptionally heavy penalties on the people for the purpose of
frightening them from the commission of crime, because [it was believed] that does not work in
practice.” 4

Shortcomings were eventually found in the Prevention of Corruption Act. One issue arose from
the language of section three of the Prevention of Corruption Bill which provided that a person
would be guilty under the act if he offers a bribe “…knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe that doing so may lead to the doing of an act by that other person which constitutes an

1

The Prevention of Corruption Act, (1956) Cap. 65 (repealed).

2

Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption Bill, July 20 1956, col. 137-38 (statement

by Mr. Conroy, Minister for Legal Affairs).
3

Id. at 137-38 (statement by Mr. Conroy, Minister for Legal Affairs).

4

Id. (statement by Mr. Conroy, Minister for Legal Affairs).

6

offense under subsection (1) of this section.” 5 The problem with this provision was that
establishing the briber’s intent in soliciting a bribe was subjective and difficult to know
truthfully. 6 Attorney General Charles Njonjo illustrated a problem that arose from this language
when he discussed a case in which the defendant was caught trying to offer a bribe to a public
service member. 7 The defendant subsequently used the excuse that he was only offering the
bribe to see if the public service member would corruptly take it. The court apparently accepted
the defendant’s story at face value and the defendant was not found guilty of corruption since he
never intended to actually give the bribe. 8

The Prevention of Corruption Bill was amended in 1967 to address this issue of the motive
behind a bribe-giver’s offer. The amended provision of the Prevention of Corruption Bill was
changed to state:

“Any person who shall by himself or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly
give, promise or offer any gift, loan, fee, reward, consideration or advantage whatever
to any person, whether for the benefit of that person or otherwise on account of, any
member officer or servant of any public body doing or forbearing to do, or having done
or forborne to do, anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or

5

Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col.

942-43 (statement by Mr. Njonjo, Attorney General).
6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

7

proposed or likely to take place, in which the said public body is concerned shall be
guilty of a felony.” 9

The text in the amended law stated nothing about the state of mind of the bribe-giver when she
offered a bribe. The Act provided that it was irrelevant whether the benefit is for that person or
for any other reason, as long as a person corruptly offers a gift, loan or some other advantage to a
public servant in exchange for that public servant to do or not do something. This offence was
classified as a felony. 10

Parliament debated at length whether the impact of holding both bribe giver and taker guilty
would have on how many instances of corruption would be reported. 11 Mr. Wariithi argued that
in the past the Prevention of Corruption Act was intended to punish corrupt public servants who
received a bribe. 12 By contrast, the amended law would punish persons who offered the bribe. 13
For Mr. Wariiithi, the main reason for targeting the bribe-taker was that public servants were
“making a mockery of the public service” 14 because many of them would demand bribes in order

9

The Prevention of Corruption Act, amended (1967) Cap. 65 §3(2); see also Kenya, The National Assembly,

Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 952-53 (statement of Mr. Osogo,
The Minister for Information and Broadcasting) (reading the relevant portion of the amended Act).
10

The Prevention of Corruption Act, amended (1967) Cap. 65 §3(2)

11

Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col.

962-64 (statement by Mr. Wariithi)
12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

8

to perform basic duties which the government owed its people. 15 Some of these duties included
permits for funeral services, getting a required Kenya Identification card, and building permits. 16
Mr. Wariithi discussed that the absence of an anti-corruption agency meant that public officials
could mainly be exposed by those who had offered them a bribe. 17 By punishing the bribe-giver,
Mr. Waritthi argued that there would no longer be someone to blow the whistle on corrupt
officials. Why would anyone go to the effort to try and “trap” a public official into accepting a
bribe when, in so doing, they would be equally as guilty under the new law wondered Mr.
Waritthi? 18 This “conspiracy of silence” would result in a decline in reported cases of corruption
in Kenya. 19

The proposed amendments to the Prevention of Corruption Act also sparked a debate on what
exactly constitutes a “gift.” 20 A broad range of opinions were expressed. Mr. Shikuku suggested
that a public figure should not accept any gifts regardless of whether they are a “bribe” or just a
friendly gesture. 21 He argued that even if a gift is just given as a gesture of kindness, it may
15

Id.

16

See James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L.

125, 182-183 (2009) [hereinafter Gathii, Human Rights and Corruption] (discussing how poor people in developing
countries often have to pay bribes for the most fundamental of government services).
17

Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col.

962-64 (statement by Mr. Wariithi).
18

Id.

19

Hansard on The Prevention of Corruption Act, p. 2.

20

Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col.

962-64 (statements made by several different ministers)
21

Id. at 945-47 (statement by Mr. Shikuku)
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affect the public servant’s decision-making in the future. 22 If that person comes to him for a
favor in the future, even though that was not the purpose of the gift at the time, the public servant
would have a difficult time turning him down than he would when dealing with someone who
had not given him a gift in the past. 23 Mr. Shikuku illustrated his argument as follows. If two
people applied for a loan, and one had given a gift to the public servant in the past as a courtesy,
even though there was no intent to corrupt, the gift giver will have a better chance of getting the
loan he needs. It is because of these unintentional consequences which may result sometime in
the future that Mr. Shikuku and others supported the proposition that public servants shouldn’t
be allowed to accept gifts in any form. 24

Like the Parliamentarians in the 1950s, Mr. Shikuku

was concerned about making the subjective intent of the bribe-giver irrelevant in determining
their culpability. 25 He thought a person who gives a gift or offers a bribe can easily hide their
true purpose and thus may be able to circumvent the purpose of the law in preventing corruption.
Such cases are possible where the repayment of the favor would not be sought for some time
after the gift is given. It is nearly impossible to say at the time one is given a gift, whether it is a
goodwill gesture or something else, for which a return favor will be sought down the road.

Other members of the Kenyan Parliament felt that “gift” must be carefully defined, because gifts
which are given out of gratitude and not for the purposes of corrupting public officers should be
allowed. Mr. Osogo, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, for instance, felt that the
amendment was only for the purpose of punishing those who “knowingly and intentionally tr[y]
22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 945-46

25

Id.

10

to corrupt a public officer.” 26 However, no amendments defining the word “gift” were made.
The word “gift” remained in §3.1 and §3.2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act without further
clarification. 27

Part II. The Amendments of 1991 and the Establishment of an AntiCorruption Body
Up until 1991, Kenya’s anti-corruption framework remained mostly unchanged from colonial
times – a four decade period. However, from 1991 very significant changes were made to
combat corruption in Kenya. This part will examine the 1991 Amendments made to the
Prevention of Corruption Act and the creation of the first Anti-Corruption Squads. Part Two will
discuss subsequent anti-corruption legislation put in place after revelations of grand corruption in
scandals like the Goldenberg Affair. These changes resulted in the creation of the much more
elaborate and sophisticated Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) to fight corruption. Part
Three will discuss the organization and structure of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, how it
came into being and its rocky beginnings under the leadership of John Harun Mwau. This part
will then after discuss the later appointment of Aaron Ringera to lead the KACA and the body’s
increasing effectiveness during this time.
26

Id. at 955-57 (statement by Mr. Osogo, The Minister for Information and Broadcasting).

27

See The Prevention of Corruption Act, (1967) Cap. 65 §§3.1–3.2. Available at

http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/LawsandConventions/Kenya_Prevention_of_Corruption_Act_1956_Repea
led.pdf
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A) The Amending of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Creation of the First
Anti-Corruption Squads in Kenya.

The Anti-Corruption Squad was established in 1991 following demands by the public for action
to be taken against those engaging in corruption. 28 At this time that anti-corruption concerns had
began to move to the forefront of the international donor community’s dialogue. 29 Transparency
International was founded in 1993, 30 and would prove to be an influential player in the
international fight against corruption through its studies and releasing of statistics ranking
countries on how rampant corruption was in their country and how successful their anticorruption measures were proving to be in practice.

28

JOHN KITHOME TUTA, KENYA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, CONTROL OF

CORRUPTION IN KENYA, LEGAL-POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 2001-2004, 66 (Ben Sihanya ed.) (2005) [hereinafter TUTA,
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA]
29

Gathii, Human Rights and Corruption, supra note 16, at 19 –21 (discussing the emergence of corruption as an

emerging focus in international law only beginning to occur in 1960s – 1970s). Professor Gathii goes on to discuss
several reasons for why there was such a delay by the international community in pushing for anti-corruption
initiatives in developing countries. Id. at 12-18. Some of the reasons given for why the international community,
and in particular the west ignored corruption in developing countries for so long include; (1) fear of criticizing
fledgling governments, (2) optimism from western countries that Africa would develop much like they had, a period
of corruption followed by a flourishing period of growth, (3) the Cold War dividing the world via political system,
and thereby causing the western countries to support any democratic country, regardless of how corrupt it was, and
(4) the idea of “virtuous bribery,” meaning that corruption and bribery actually aided a developing country because
it allowed for the circumventing of inefficient regulations. Id.
30

Transparency International website, available at http://www.transparency.org/about_us.
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The Anti-Corruption Squad was a special investigative unit answerable to the Criminal
Investigations Department - it was part of the Kenya Police and was headed by a Senior Police
Officer. 31 The Anti-Corruption Squad proved ineffective in its fight against corruption. 32 It had
only a few investigators, who were paid the same as regular police officers. 33 Furthermore,
owing to the fact that it was part of the executive branch and not an independent agency, its
investigators were undoubtedly afraid to investigate cases of high level corruption or corruption
within the government in general. 34 The government under President Moi was notoriously
corrupt and relied on a system of patronage and bribery to maintain order and control. 35 The
Anti-Corruption Squad officers were hesitant to pursue corrupt officials who were their superiors
and responsible for their employment and pay. It is also worth mentioning that there were
allegations that the Anti-Corruption Squad itself was corrupt. 36 This was not surprising since for
years the Police Department has widely been considered the most corrupt sector of the
government. 37 Even today the Kenyan public still regards the Police as among the most corrupt
in government. Police often take bribes to refrain from giving out traffic tickets and arresting

31

TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 66.

32

Id. at 66-67.

33

Id. at 66.

34

35

Id. at 67.
Nick Wadhams, Kenyan President Moi’s Corruption Laid Bare, THE TELEGRAPH U.K., Sept. 1, 2007 (discussing

how Moi and his two sons ran the government corruptly for their own gain).
36

TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA , supra note 28, at 67.

37

Survey: Police are Most Corrupt in Kenya, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, July 18, 2008, available at

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/07/18/Survey-Police-are-most-corrupt-in-Kenya/UPI-86741216399685.
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people found breaking the law. 38 The Anti-Corruption Squad lasted for roughly three years, and
was disbanded after a fire burnt files held by the squad. At the time of its disbandment, it had
made little headway in the fight against corruption. 39

B) The Establishment of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Squad and the Goldenberg
Scandal which Gave Rise to its Creation.

Notwithstanding the failings and weaknesses inherent in Kenya’s first anti-corruption institution,
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) was established as an investigative body to help
discover and curb instances of corruption. President Moi was widely believed to have
established the KACA to retain large amounts of donor aid flowing into the country through both
western countries and international organizations. 40 Kenya had nearly lost all of its aid from the
World Bank after the World Bank suspended all aid flowing into the country besides emergency
and critical human development assistance because of the pervasive and endemic nature of

38

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX (2009) (stating that based on a survey of over

10,000 people, the police department of Kenya is the most corrupt institution in all of East Africa). Available at
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2009/2009_07_02_kenya_index; see also
Robyn Dixon and Nicholas Soi, Police Corruption Rampant in Kenya Despite Attempts at Reform, L.A. TIMES, June
13, 2004 (discussing the rampant corruption in the Kenya Police through several people’s stories of bribes and
imprisonment).
39

TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 67.

40

Hon. Musikari Kombo, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Planning and National Development , Corruption and

Economic Reforms in Kenya, at the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference, in Adili Transparency Int’l,
June 2003, at 3-4. [hereinafter Corruption and Economic Reforms in Kenya] Available at
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/Adili38.pdf.

14

corruption in Kenya. KACA’s establishment was therefore not an indication that the government
was dedicated to fighting corruption.

As noted above, the Goldenberg scandal had led to the withdrawal of foreign aid flows to Kenya.
The scandal involved a plot between a Kenyan businessman, Kamlesh Pattni and several highlevel members of the Kenyan government. Mr. Pattni is alleged to have conspired with these
government officials to have his company, Goldenberg International, be awarded government
contracts to export fictitious amounts of gold and diamonds from Kenya to the rest of the world.
In return the official would be compensated with a percentage of the money Kenya made from
the sale. 41 Under the agreement, the Kenyan government agreed to pay Goldenberg International
at the rate of 35% of its exports. This is well above the 20% set as the limit under the Local
Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act. 42 When the Commissioner of Customs and Excise
Department declined to pay this inflated compensation, Mr. Saitoti as the Minister of Finance
ordered it to be paid from the Treasury anyways. 43 This inflated illegal compensation percentage
resulted in Goldenberg International being paid an extra $4.2 million over the course of two
years. 44 These monies constituted public funds that it otherwise wouldn’t have had to pay, had
the government contracted out for an appropriate compensation rate.

41

James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Expanding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law

as an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 407, 428 (1999) [hereinafter Gathii, Corruption and
Donor Reforms].
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 429.
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C) The Creation of the KACA, its Framework and Effectiveness in Fighting
Corruption

The KACA was created by an amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act which added
section11B. That amendment set out KACA’s mandate as being:
a. To take necessary measures for the prevention of corruption in the public,
parastatal and private sectors;
b. To investigate, and subject to the directions of the Attorney General, to
prosecute for offences under this Act and other offences involving corrupt
transactions; and
c. to advise the Government and the parastatal organizations on ways and means
of preventing corruption;
d. to inquire and investigate the extent of liability of any public officer in the lots
of any public funds and institute civil proceedings against the officer and any
other person involved in the transaction which resulted in the loss for the
recovery of such loss;
e. to investigate any conduct of a public officer which is connected with or
conducive to corrupt practices and to make suitable recommendation thereon;
f. to undertake such further or other investigations as may be directed by the
Attorney General. 45

45

See Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & Albert Muthee Kahuria v. Republic, (2000) from the Republic of Kenya in the

High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 302 of 2000 at page 7.
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Unlike the Anti-Corruption Squad, KACA had a fairly elaborate institutional framework. The
1997 amendment had also created the Kenya Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (KAAB) whose
membership was comprised of people from professional, religious, labor, and non-governmental
organizations. 46 This body was created to advise KACA on how to go about fighting corruption.
At the helm, KACA had a director and three assistant directors who were responsible for
investigations, prosecutions, financing and operations. KAAB served as an advisory board to
ensure the investigators were made aware of the opinions and concerns of all different sectors of
the society. 47

Despite being given an elaborate framework enable it to successfully carry out investigations and
prosecutions and being relatively independent from the three branches of government, KACA
struggled from its inception. Its first director John Harun Mwau and his staff had no well laid
down plans to combat corruption. In fact, John Harun Mwau was probably not the most
qualified choice to head the body to fight corruption, and he was apparently appointed to the
position as head of KACA in return for dropping out of the 1997 Presidential elections. 48 If this
is so, Mwau was appointed to office not based on merit, but instead based on Kenya’s system of
patronage and bribery. Perhaps Mwau’s lack of qualification for the position of Director of the
KACA was responsible for the fractured and incoherent approach the KACA took at first in the
46

TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 67.

47

TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 68.

48

See, Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41, at 438 (“However, prior to his appointment as the

Director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, Mwau withdrew his candidacy for the presidential elections in
December 1997. Upon his withdrawal from the presidential race, Mwau then asked his supporters to vote for
President Moi.”).
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fight against corruption. 49 The resources given to the KACA were minimal and as such it was
impeded from successfully investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption. Director Mwau
had to resort to donating his private offices so that the KACA would have a base for its
operations. 50

John Harun Mwau and the KACA did eventually bring to court senior court officials on charges
of corruption. In 1998, Kenya Revenue Authority senior officials from the Ministry of Finance,
were charged in court in a case involving then powerful Cabinet Minister Simeon Nyachae. 51
However, Attorney General Amos Wako terminated the cases brought to court by the KACA.
The Attorney General argued that the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority had gone to court
without first obtaining the AG’s consent to prosecute as required by the Constitution. 52 The
Attorney General’s reasons for terminating the cases were not persuasive. The alleged offenses
committed by the Finance Minister and other government officials were related to fraudulent
imports. 53 Cases involving fraudulent imports generally were not of the type that first required
the consent of the AG. 54
49

See, TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 68 (describing the initial efforts of the KACA

as being “unconventional” and “unorthodox”).
50

See, Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41

51

Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41, at 441.

52

Id.; see also TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA , supra note 28, at 68. .

53

TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA, supra note 28, at 68.

54

Id. (“In particular, it was alleged that Mwau had acted ultra vires his powers by arraigning suspects in court

without the sanction of the Attorney General Amos Wako. Incidentally, the matter in issue arose from offences
touching on fraudulent imports that ordinarily did not require the consent or sanction of the Attorney General before
prosecution.”).
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Not only did the Kenyan Executive branch remove the KACA’s cases from the docket, it also
went on to remove its leader as well. The President appointed a tribunal to evaluate the
competence of Director Mwau not long after he and his agency brought some judicial officers
and high level ministers to court on corruption charges. 55 The timing of this effort to investigate
Mwau caused many to wonder whether this was related to the charges brought against senior
officials. It is very plausible that the Director was sought to be removed for being a thorn in the
side of the corrupt government. 56 The tribunal declared Mr. Mwau “incompetent” and the
President accordingly removed him from his post as Director. 57

The judiciary had once again stepped in and impeded the agency and its fight against corruption.
This was rapidly becoming common happenstance and once again the judiciary had acted on
questionable legal grounds. While Director Mwau’s methods in leading the KACA may have

55

Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms, supra note 41, at 445 (“These events began to lead to questions about the

government's commitment to eliminating corruption in the country. It appeared as if the appointment of Harun
Mwau to head the Anti-Corruption Authority was part of a government design to merely put up a big show of its
commitment to fighting corruption to win the donor community's approval for resumption of the enhanced structural
enhancement facility.”).
56

Corruption and Economic Reforms in Kenya, supra note 40, at 3-4.

57

Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reform, supra note 41, at 442; see also TUTA, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN

KENYA, supra note 41, at 68; MARS GROUP KENYA, A MARS GROUP REPORT ON THE REPORT OF THE KENYA ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION TO PARLIAMENT 2005-2006 (“John Harun Mwau was dismissed for incompetence
following a tribunal appointed under the [Prevention of Corruption Act].”). The tribunal found that Harun Mwau
had “too highly inflated a view of himself to work in harmony with others.” Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms,
supra note 41, at 446.
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been questionable at first, 58 the Director and his agency had just started to show progress and
initiative in fighting corruption when this decision to remove him was made. The government
partly redeemed itself when it named Justice Aaron Ringera as Mr. Mwau’s replacement. This
does not, however, end the Executive from getting in the way of the anti-corruption agenda. As
we shall see, Aaron Ringera was forced to resign in shame several years later.

Before his appointment to head KACA, Mr. Ringera had been a well-respected High Court
Judge. As a High Court Judge, he had an extremely strong legal background unlike Mwau who
had none. Notwithstanding such a promising appointee, some still suggested that this
appointment was motivated by a desire to appease donors so that Kenya could retain its
international aid flow. There were doubts that the government was committed to eliminating
corruption. 59 That notwithstanding, this appointment of High Court Judge Ringera ushered in
the so-called “golden age” of the KACA. 60 No longer were the anti-corruption plans of the
agency scattered and incoherent, but instead a comprehensive strategy for investigating and
prosecuting those in office found to be acting corruptly was put in place. 61 Using a threepronged approach, the KACA under Mr. Ringera made steps toward building a culture of
accountability and transparency in Kenya. This approach included: “[t]he consistent
enforcement of the law against corruption; the prevention of corruption by removing the
opportunities that facilitate the crime; and the education of the public and enlistment of their
58
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support in the fight against corruption.” 62 For the first time, the KACA had offered some hope
that all would not be the same any more. 63 However, this was not destined to last.

Part III. Gachiengo Decision and the Demise of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption
Authority

In 2000 the anti-corruption fight experienced another major setback from a decision handed
down by a Constitutional Court. In Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & Albert Muthee Kahuria v.
Republic of Kenya (hereinafter “Gachiengo”) a Constitutional Court held that KACA’s existence
was a violation of the constitutional separation of powers and consequently found that it was
unconstitutional. 64 In this landmark corruption prosecution case, the defense, on behalf of four
persons, raised four constitutional questions regarding the KACA and the Prevention of
Corruption Act: 65 First, whether it was contrary to the separation of powers for High Court
Judge Ringera to also serve as director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority. That Judge
Ringera must, therefore, choose to be either a High Court Judge or Director of the KACA.
Second, whether having a High Court Judge as Director of KACA prevents the accused from
enjoying the right to a fair trial because the lower court Magistrates will be hesitant to rule
against the High Court Judge who obviously felt that the accused were guilty if he had the
KACA investigate and prosecute them. Third whether the Attorney General’s consent to the
62
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prosecutions initiated by the KACA was valid under the constitution; and fourth whether §11(B)
of The Prevention of Corruption Act, which established KACA, was in conflict with the
Constitution. 66

With regard to question one – whether Justice Ringera sitting as the Director of the Kenya AntiCorruption Authority violates separation of powers – the Constitutional Court held that it was an
unconstitutional breach of separation of powers to have Justice Ringera be a member of both the
Executive and the Judiciary. As such he had to choose to either remain a High Court Judge or
retire from the High Court and continue to direct the KACA. 67 The Court’s reasoning was that
the judiciary should not be “subject to the dictates of either the executive or the legislature” and
when Judge Ringera took his oath to head the KACA he became a part of the Executive branch
also and was no longer bound by the judicial oath. 68 As such, the court ruled that Justice
Ringera’s position as High Court Judge was being compromised. 69

The court went on to hold that it is only the Attorney General who is permitted under the
Constitution to prosecute. 70 Given the fact that the Attorney General was not controlling or
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actively overseeing KACA, as required by §26(3), §26(b), and §26(c) of the Constitution; the
court declared KACA to be unconstitutional. According to the court, KACA was a corporate
entity and not an agency complementary to the Attorney General and as such it could not
unilaterally investigate and prosecute cases. 71

The court in addition, held that §10 and §11B of The Prevention of Corruption Act, which
created the KACA and set out guidelines for it to fight against corruption, were in direct conflict
with §26 of the Constitution which gave the Attorney General his exclusive prosecutorial
powers. 72 As such, the court held that KACA undermined the Commissioner of Police and the
Attorney General because its investigatory and prosecutorial powers were infringing on the
powers and rights vested to these institutions by the Constitution.73

This effect of this decision effectively terminated the KACA’s existence. 74 The court’s holding
– that the Attorney General’s prior consent to KACA prosecutions was not valid and that the
KACA was acting unilaterally, separate from the Attorney General, and in violation of the

in reality, the Attorney General had very little say and control over KACA, which is only answerable to its Director
or the Advisory Board. Id. at 6.
71
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constitution has been very widely and, in my view, correctly criticized as being incorrect. 75 The
Attorney General himself spoke out after the decision saying that his “office was working
harmoniously with KACA” 76 and that his ultimate control and direction over the prosecutions
was never put in jeopardy by the KACA’s investigation and prosecution of corruption-related
crimes. 77

A major shortcoming of the Gachiengo decision was that the High Court did not correctly
construe §26 of the Kenyan Constitution. §26 states in part:

The Attorney-General shall have power in any case in which he considers it
desirable so to do: (a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any
person before any court (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence
alleged to have been committed by that person; (b) to take over and continue any

75
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such criminal proceedings that have been instituted or undertaken by another
person or authority; and (c) to discontinue at any stage before judgement is
delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or
another person or authority. 78

The language of §26 does not exclusively reserve to the Attorney General the power to prosecute
criminal cases. Further, it would be impossible for the Attorney General to be the sole person
with the power to initiate criminal proceedings. For this reason, the Attorney General has
extended his prosecutorial powers to other bodies such as the National Social Security Fund as
well as other assistants to aid in dealing with the sheer number of cases that come before him. 79
In fact, the Attorney General has granted prosecutorial powers, albeit in a limited scope, to quite
a few governmental bodies. These include the “Kenya Bureau of Standards, the National Health
Insurance Fund and the Kenya Society for the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals.” 80 These
bodies are all very similar to the KACA in that they have been delegated the power to initiate
prosecutions within their limited scope of expertise. Their powers are all contained in a small,
specialized area of litigation and this power to prosecute not only makes it possible for them to
carry out their specialized task, but it also aids the Attorney General in relieving that area of
litigation from his case load – one which his office would be unable to fully handle alone.

78
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It is also true that the exclusive powers vested in the Attorney General by the Constitution do not
include the exclusive right to prosecute. Rather this exclusivity only applies to his right to take
over, continue or terminate criminal proceedings that have already been instituted or undertaken
by another person or authority. 81 If this is the case, then the fact that KACA was initiating its
own suits, with at least apparent consent from the AG would be perfectly consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution. On this view, a violation would only occur if the KACA tried to
intervene and take over a suit taken by either the Attorney General or a third party citizen or
organization.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Gachiengo judicial decision was that once again the
Judiciary had handed down a decision which gave no weight to the immense fight going on in
Kenya to try and eradicate or at least minimize corruption. A government minister noted that
“[t]he court displayed a shocking ignorance of the policy issues leading to the establishment of
KACA.” 82 In fact, it was apparent that the Gachiengo court did not deem the amendment to The
Prevention of Corruption Act which established the KACA to be necessary. 83 At this point, this
anti-corruption law had been in effect for nearly fifty years and amended several times;
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corruption was still ran rampant, and the government was trying to step up corruption and give
an anti-corruption agency the teeth that the previous agency did not possess. It seemed hard to
believe for many that the judicial branch was so unaware of the struggles Kenya was having in
dealing with corruption that it would deem the KACA an unnecessary institution. Further, the
Constitutional Court needed not have so far as to eradicate the KACA and leave Kenya without
an independent anti-corruption agency.

It is argued by John Kithome Tuta in his essay “Evolution of Anti-Corruption Policy and
Institutional Framework” that the Constitutional Court hearing Gathiengo could have easily
faulted some provisions of The Prevention of Corruption Act, kept the Act as a whole and the
KACA as viable means to fight corruption. This would have required presenting Parliament
some amendment so to Corruption statute so as to bring the KACA within the parameters
allowed by the Constitution. 84 Given the long, difficult battle against corruption in Kenya dating
back nearly fifty years at that time, it would seem that this method of fine tuning the existing
anti-corruption mechanics rather than tossing the baby with the bathwater.
The problems which stemmed from the questionable decision handed down by the
Constitutional Court in the Gachiengo case were further exacerbated by the Attorney General’s
decision on December 29, 2000. On that day, Attorney General, Amos Wako announced that he
would respect the decision of the court and would therefore not appeal the Gachiengo decision. 85
This came as a bit of a surprise, especially given the fact that after the court handed down its
ruling, the Attorney General made it a point to publically disagree with the court’s decision with
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regard to the constitutionality of his consent to KACA prosecutions and the question whether or
not he controlled the KACA prosecutions. 86

Part IV. Fighting Corruption in the Aftermath of the Gachiengo Decision
The demise of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority at the hands of the Constitutional Court was
met with outrage in the international community. Since the Kenyan government relies heavily on
international aid, many donors were unwilling to continue funneling aid to Kenya if the
government did not show that it was dedicated to fighting and eradicating corruption. It very well
may have been because of donor disapproval that the government under President Daniel Moi,
which otherwise may have been happy to let the system of patronage and bribery continue,
enacted further legislation to fight corruption.

One year following, several possible approaches to fill the void the agency left behind by
KACA’s demise were considered. Parliament proposed a Constitutional amendment which
would have amended §26(3)(a) so that it would no longer would be in direct conflict with §11(B)
of The Prevention of Corruption Act. This would have laid and the constitutionality of the
KACA to rest. The amendment would have entrenched the anti-corruption body in the
Constitution so as to guarantee its continued existence and ensure that it would not be dismantled
by a corrupt judiciary. 87 The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)(No.3) Act, 2001 would have
achieved that result by giving KACA the power to investigate and institute criminal proceedings
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to more than just the Attorney General. If it had passed, the Attorney General would no longer
have the exclusive mandate to conduct criminal proceedings. As such, KACA would have been
able to criminally charge someone under an anti-corruption law, as well be able to investigate
and proceed with these cases without needing to have the consent of the Attorney General and
without worrying about a court declaring that it overstepped its bounds by bringing a corruptionrelated case to trial. However, the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)(No.3) Act, 2001 was
never passed by the Kenyan Parliament and, in fact never even passed the Parliamentary vote to
reach the Third Reading of it. 88

One reason why Parliament accounted for non-passage of this bill was because some Members
of Parliament thought that there was nothing wrong with the Constitutional Court’s decision in
Gachiengo. 89 In addition, the process of amending the constitution is thought to be a long,
serious process and arguably should not be done unless absolutely necessary. Since, in the eyes
of these Parliamentarians, the Constitution of Kenya does in fact allow for the establishment of
an anti-corruption body with investigative and prosecutorial power, it was, in their view, unwise
to amend the constitution when it is not actually a roadblock to KACA fighting corruption. For
these Parliamentarians, it was the judiciary that was the problem in the anti-corruption agenda. 90

The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)(No.3) Act, 2001 also faced large-scale opposition in
the Parliament because many members of Parliament were very opposed to the insertion of an
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amnesty clause for those who had engaged in corruption in the past. 91 Inclusion of the amnesty
provision was seen as an attempt by the Moi Government to protect itself from the legal
ramifications of the corrupt practices engaged in throughout the regime’s history. In opposition
to this, some Parliamentarians argued that a government truly dedicated to the fight against
corruption must also maintain a sense of “transitional justice.” 92 Transitional justice in this
context was defined by John Githongo, the former Permanent Secretary of Governance and
Ethics not as a whitewash of previous crimes, but as taking into account “that past economic
crimes, especially those that have manifestly impoverished Kenyans need to be addressed in a
systematic manner as part of a credible process.” 93 In other words, a government’s fight against
corruption does not hold credibility in its own eyes and in those of the public if it does not
actively prosecute and investigate instances of corruption which may have happened in the past.

A second avenue the government took in the aftermath of the Gachiengo decision to try and
prevent Kenya’s anti-corruption infrastructure from crumbling was a new Corruption Control
Bill. The Corruption Control Bill was intended to establish the Kenya Corruption Control
Authority (KCCA). 94 This bill attempted to make the KCCA answerable “only to Parliament for
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the performance of its functions.” 95 The bill was an attempt by Parliament to cure the procedural
and constitutional defects discussed above with regard to the authority of the KACA to
prosecute. Under the Corruption Control Bill, the KCCA would have had the power to
investigate corruption cases and then the Attorney General would institute criminal proceedings
via public prosecutors previously appointed to the task. 96 This bill was eventually passed by
Parliament in 2002; however it never became law due in large part to the Presidential elections
taking place that year. President Kibuki won the election and his NARC party decided not to
enact the bill, but instead to alter and create a new bill.

In the interim, as the Parliament struggled to pass new bills related to anti-corruption agencies
and/or constitutional amendments, the government established the Anti-Corruption Police Unit. 97
The ACPU inherited all the cases the now-defunct KACA had been working on. 98 However,
similar to the former anti-corruption squad established in 1991, the Police Unit did not have
sufficient resources or a structure to enable it to undertake its tasks effectively. This is especially
true because of the questionable legal situation surrounding the ACPU in the wake of the
judiciary’s decision in the Gachiengo case and Parliament’s inability to pass legislation to
remedy problems in the Prevention of Corruption Act identified by the Gachiengo decision. For
example, an Advisory Board was eventually set up, much like the one KACA had to help give
advice to the ACPU on how to go about its job of investigating corruption cases. However,
unlike the previous Advisory Board for the KACA, this Committee “was largely inactive,” in
95
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part because there was no legal basis for its existence. 99 Another problem with the ACPU was
that it was less independent from the other branches than was the KACA. Again, similar to the
Anti-Corruption squads, the ACPU was headed by the Commissioner of Police and was a part of
the Kenyan police force and its boss would have to answer to the Director of the Criminal
Investigations Department. 100 Nonetheless, the ACPU managed to do its job surprisingly well
given its deficiencies and ties to the police force. It received more complaints than the KACA
had and filed more reports than the KACA had after following up on these complaints. 101

One of the bigger adverse consequences brought about by the Gachiengo decision is the effect it
had on all the pending cases that KACA had initiated against corrupt officials. Once KACA was
stripped of its legal authority for prosecuting corruption, all the cases it was investigating and
planning to prosecute were handed over to the Attorney General and ACPU. However, none of
these cases resulted in a conviction and all were either not prosecuted by the AG or if they were
prosecuted they were dismissed by the courts. 102 One of the most notable of these cases was that
of Kipng’eno arap Ng’eny in Republic. v. Attorney-General & Another Ex parte Kipng’eno arap
Ng’eny. 103 Mr. Kipng’eno arap Ng’eny was a very powerful Cabinet Minister who was charged
by the KACA with high-level or “grand” corruption. 104 Mr. Ng’eny had apparently been corrupt
for a number of years. However, it was not until the KACA was created that attempts to hold
99
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him accountable for his graft were made. The Attorney General finally initiated a prosecution
against Ng’eny in 2001, after having dragged his feet on this matter for a number of years. 105
However, the High Court issued an order directing the Attorney General not to bring further
charges against Mr. Ng’eny because of the nine year delay from the time of the corrupt acts and
the commencement of the suit against him. 106 However, this “unexplained” delay can be
accounted for by the fact that up until the establishment of KACA in 1997, there was no anticorruption watchdog going after high-level, corrupt members of the government. The Ng’eny
decision signaled the end of KACA and all of its work it had done in fighting corrupt offenders..
It was quite clear that none of the officials investigated and suspected of corruption by the
KACA would be brought to justice until a new anti-corruption body was created.

A) The 2002 Elections and the Rise of the NARC Party

The Presidential elections of 2002 were a very monumental event in the history of Kenya and in
particular in its fight against corruption. Newly-elected President Mwai Kibaki of the National
Rainbow Coalition (“NARC”) was sworn into office, finally drawing to a close the corrupt
tenure of President Moi as the leader of Kenya. It also signaled the end of the dominance of the
KANU party which lost the 2002 election in the face of a united opposition led by Mwai Kibaki.
Corruption and the people’s desire for a government dedicated to its eradication played a large
part in determining the results of the election. One of the main pillars of President Kibaki’s
candidacy was his denouncement of Moi’s KANU party as corrupt and promises to the people to
fight and end corruption as a way of life. To many, his election in 2002 signaled a time of hope
105
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in which government reform would bring about a new way of life in Kenya. 107 President Kabaki
carried over this anti-corruption momentum into office with him and quickly began pushing
through measures to fight corruption in many different ways.

President Kibaki first created a new Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. 108 The
purpose of this position was to coordinate the anti-corruption efforts so as to make them more
effective and consistent. In the past, the efforts of the government were often sporadic and
inconsistent, so much so that they caused international organizations, foreign donors, and critics
of Kenya’s policies in general to question the level of commitment the previous KANU party
government had to actually fighting corruption. 109 Today, the Ministry’s functions and efforts
have extended to almost every area of society dealing with corruption including the political
parties, elections, the Kenya School of Law, and human rights and social justice. 110

Shortly after his arrival in office, President Kibaki also created the position of Permanent
Secretary in the Office of the President for Governance and Ethics within his Presidential
Cabinet. He appointed John Githongo, the former Executive Director of Transparency
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International, Kenya to this post. Githongo was widely viewed as a well-regarded, trustworthy
person to head this important position and he came into the office determined to wage war
against the corruption that has plagued the country for so long.

Part V. The Enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and
Public Officer Ethics Act

The biggest anti-corruption initiative taken by President Kibaki and his NARC party at the outset
of his Presidency was the passing of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act as well as
the Public Officer Ethics Act in May 2003. Part 1 will examine the framework for the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes Act in depth. Part 2 will then talk about the Public Officer
Ethics Act. Part 3 will discuss the shortcomings of this legislation in practice.

A) The Enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and its
Framework

The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (hereinafter “ACECA”) filled the hole left by
the KACA’s demise following the Kenya Constitutional Court’s Gachiengo decision. 111 The
ACECA established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (hereinafter “KACC”) as the
newest corruption fighting body in Kenya. 112 The KACC would have to face the same obstacles
imposed on the KACA by the Constitutional Court’s conclusion in Gachiengo, namely that these
anti-corruption bodies established through acts of Parliament did not have the explicit power to
111
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prosecute anti-corruption crimes under the Constitution of Kenya. The ACECA did not even
suggest that the KACC would have the ability to prosecute, probably because Parliament still
comprised of individuals who had benefitted immensely from corruption in the past. 113 Instead,
the ACECA attempted several methods of ensuring the success and effectiveness of the KACC’s
anti-corruption efforts while stopping short of granting prosecutorial powers. For one, ACECA
gave the Attorney General and the Judicial Branch little unfettered discretion by seeking to hold
them accountable for any questionable decisions hindering the conviction of the corrupt and the
fight against corruption in general. 114 For example, ACECA gave the KACC very broad powers
of powers of investigation. The new law also sought to make the Attorney General accountable
for his decisions on whether or not to prosecute suspects reported to him by the KACC.

As we shall see below, the extensive investigatory powers of the KACC include the ability “to
investigate any matter that in the Commission’s opinion, raises suspicion that any of the
following have occurred or are about to occur --- (i) conduct constituting corruption or economic
crime; (ii) conduct liable to allow, encourage or cause conduct constituting corruption or
113
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economic crime.” 115 The KACC also has the power under the ACECA to investigate the
conduct of any person, 116 branch of the government, 117 corporations, 118 and local authority, 119
and this list is not exhaustive. The KACC was also given “all the powers necessary or expedient
for the performance of its functions,” 120 and in the course of carrying out investigations,
investigators are given the privileges and immunities of police officers. 121 The KACC has the
power to demand, upon reasonable suspicion, a declaration of the suspected person’s property. 122
The purpose for this being that should a person be found in possession of wealth far beyond what
one would expect given his/her job or upbringing, this may raise suspicion of corruption.

The

penalty for someone who fails to comply with the KACC’s demand is subject to a fine of up to
Kshs. 300,000 and/or imprisonment for up to three years. 123 In the same vein, the KACC is also
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given the power to demand through notice in writing “any information or documents in the
person’s possession that relate to a person suspected of corruption or economic crime.” 124 The
KACC can submit their demand for these documents to any person, regardless of whether or not
they have specifically targeted that person for possible corruption-related offenses. The same
goes for requests by the KACC for records in a person’s possession under §28 of the ACECA.
The penalties for both of these offenses mirror those discussed above; a fine up to Kshs. 300,000
and/or imprisonment for up to three years. Furthermore, in situations where those sequestered
refuse to comply with the KACC’s demands for information, the KACC still has powers to
uncover the information it may want. KACC’s investigators can obtain warrants from the courts
to search for “any record, property or other thing reasonably suspected to be in or on the
premises and that has not been produced by a person.” 125 A final investigatory power conferred
on the KACC was that the KACC can submit an ex parte application to the court requesting that
a person who is reasonably suspected of economic crime to be required to hand over their travel
documents so as to prevent them from fleeing the country. 126 This helps the KACC in its
investigations of corruption because it prevents suspects, evidence, and/or witnesses from
leaving the country and avoiding the jurisdiction of both the KACC and the court if prosecutions
are deemed appropriate. All of the investigative powers discussed above combine to give the
KACC the ability to get to the bottom of corruption in a variety of ways. 127
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Id. §27(3).

125

Id. §29(1)
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Id. §31(1).

127

Albeit without the ability to punish those they investigate.
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However, many of these powers have been challenged as being in conflict with the fundamental
criminal principle of affording those who are accused the presumption of innocence until proven
guilty. 128 The arguments made here are that KACC has the power to significantly infringe on a
person’s right and freedoms through a unilateral decision that the person is a corruption suspect.
In fact, many of KACC’s powers do not require any binding legal determinations by courts
before it can exercise them. As discussed above, these rights potentially taken away include the
right for corruption suspects to leave the country, the right of a person to be free from intrusion
into their privacy and the right to have their assets kept free of governmental intrusion.
Furthermore, the suspects can be punished either financially or through imprisonment if they fail
to comply with the exercise of KACC’s powers. 129

The second aspect of the ACECA which is designed to make certain that the KACC doesn’t
become a lame duck due to its inability to initiate prosecutions is its system of annual reports it
and must make to Parliament and the citizens of Kenya. The KACC is also sought to be kept
accountable and transparent through §25 of the ACECA. According to this provision, if the
KACC chooses not to pursue a complaint, “the Commission shall inform the complainant in
writing of its decision and of the reasons for its decision.” 130 This assures the public, in theory,
that the KACC will not be bribed or take into account political favors, personal relationships, or
any other outside factors when determining what cases it will recommend to the Attorney
General for the institution of formal legal proceedings.

128

Under Kenyan law, the Presumption of Innocence principle is found in CONSTITUTION, Art. 77 (2001) (Kenya).

129

Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act
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Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, (2003) Cap. 65 §25 (emphasis added).
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The ACECA also sets out to bring a level of accountability and transparency to the prosecutorial
decisions the Attorney General makes as well. The KACC is given the task of preparing
quarterly reports which “set[] out the number of reports made to the Attorney General . . . and
[these reports] shall indicate if a recommendation of the Commission to prosecute a person for
corruption or economic crime was not accepted [by the Attorney General].” 131 In conjunction
with this, the Attorney General has the responsibility of preparing his own annual reports. 132 The
Attorney General’s reports should set out the steps he took during the course of the year, 133 and
any recommendations made by the KACC that were not accepted. The AG must lay out
“succinctly the reasons for not accepting the recommendations.” 134 Both of these reports, (that
of the KACC and of the AG), must be submitted to the National Assembly. 135 Furthermore, the
report of the KACC must be submitted to the Gazette for publication to the general public. 136
This system of reporting is based on at least two main ideas about how to bring about neutrality
and accountability to the process of bringing about prosecutions for corruption. One being that,
with both bodies submitting reports they will both prevent one body from misleading Parliament
and the public about their role in combating corruption. Secondly, if the Attorney General
continues to drag his feet with regard to bringing corruption suspects into court, there will be
more concrete proof available to both the government and the public to determine whether he is
indeed impeding the country’s fight against corruption. The same goes for the court system, if
131

Id. §§36(1)-36(2).
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Id. §37.
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Id. §37(3).
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Id. §36(5).
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the courts continue to throw out corruption cases, it will be more widely known and documented
exactly which part of the government is dragging its feet in addressing corruption.

The ACECA also provided for the appointment of special magistrates for hearing corruption
cases. 137 These magistrates are responsible for the trying of “any offense punishable under [The
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act]” 138 as well as any conspiracy to commit these
activities labeled a crime under the ACECA. 139 Since then an anti-corruption court has been
established. 140

The foregoing provisions of the ACECA were all written to remedy the defects of previous anticorruption legislation and to try and improve on and learn from the past mistakes made. The
anti-corruption framework laid down by the ACECA is the most comprehensive to date.
However there are still many criticisms of this framework. The next step is to look at some of
the negative claims made about the ACECA and KACC at the time of their commencement and
whether these alleged defects have caused problems in practice. However, before engaging in
that evaluation, another important piece of legislation that also came into effect in 2003 will be
discussed.
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“The Anti-Corruption Court specifically handles matters dealing with graft in public and private office . . . . Anti-

Corruption Courts are located across the country in areas such as Nairobi, Kiambu, Nyeri, and Kisumu. The
Republic of Kenya, Judiciary, Court Structure,
http://www.judiciary.go.ke/judiciary/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=289&Itemid=407.
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B) The Enactment of the Public Officer Ethics Bill

The Public Officer Ethics Bill was the first of its type in Kenya. Its purpose was different from
earlier pieces of anti-corruption legislation passed by the Kenyan Parliament. The purpose of
this law was “to advance the ethics of public officers by providing for a Code of Conduct and
Ethics for public officers.” 141 This was part of the broad anti-corruption strategy the NARC
government wanted to instill after President Kibaki came into power. Up until this point, anticorruption legislation had taken the form of merely defining corrupt behavior and determining
how severely to punish each type of behavior it defines as corrupt. 142 However, contemporary

141

Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 Preamble. Furthermore, the bill was stated as being intended to

“define the basic values, principles and set boundaries of acceptable behavior[]r by public officials in this country
(Kenya). We also hope to provide a legal framework for restoring public confidence in our Civil Service.” Kenya,
The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 446 (statement by Mr.
Murungi, Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs).
142

This is the case for all the legislation discussed so far. The Prevention of Corruption Act defined the type of

behavior in the civil service which would was illegal and would be punished under the act. See supra, “The passing
of the Prevention of Corruption Bill.” The purpose of the bill was to make nearly certain that those who engage in
corruption would be caught. Id. The same goes for the proposed Corruption Control Bill which sought to create
another anti-corruption investigatory/prosecutorial body to root out those who were corrupt. See supra “Fighting
Corruption in the Aftermath of the Gachiengo Decision.” Also, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act,
2003 went about fighting corruption in the same manner by creating the KACC and further defining and elaborating
what exactly defines corruption. See supra “The Enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and
its framework.”
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attitudes about corruption and how to fight it had begun to shift. 143 The realization that for the
fight against corruption to be successful, a government would have to do more than create an allencompassing definition of corruption and a body to investigate and enforce it was gaining
currency. While defining and investigating corruption are both integral parts of the fight against
corruption, when they are supplemented by other reform efforts a much greater effect is possible.
This is where the Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003 comes into play. By promoting
professionalism and integrity in the public service through a code of conduct and model
standards rather than by threat of punishment, the Public Officer Ethics Act was implemented to
help curb corruption in a different way. This will in turn help the KACC fight corruption since
even the greatest of investigatory bodies will not successfully uncover all cases of corruption.
Some of these “supplemental” measures include educating the public on corruption and its
effects.

The Public Officer Ethics Act, (POEA), created a general Code of Conduct and Ethics. This
code of conduct sets out a number of provisions for the members of the public service to follow.
A public officer is to “carry out his duties and ensure that the services that s/he provides are
provided efficiently and honestly.” 144 The Public Officer Ethics Act requires very specific
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Gathii, supra note 16, at 126-29. The IMF for example emphasized more than just the definition/investigation

approach to fighting anti-corruption, but instead stressed “the importance of promoting good governance in all its
aspects” including, among other things, “improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector.” Press
Release, IMF Interim Committee, Interim Committee Declaration on Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth
(Sept. 29, 1996) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/dec.pdf (emphasis added).
144

Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 §8.
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standards to be followed including treating others with courtesy and respect; 145 taking no
unwarranted absences; 146 proper hygiene and dress; 147 avoidance of conflicts of interest in the
discharge of their duties; 148 refraining from using their office as a means for personal
enrichment; 149 and following the rule of law in the discharge of their duties. 150 This list is not
all-inclusive, the POEA lists a vast array of standards and responsibilities the public officials are
expected to comply with. 151 This specific Code of Conduct and Ethics applies to public officials
until a more specialized Commission passed through their own Code of Conduct for their
relevant subsection of the Public Service. 152 These specialized commissions have the authority to
go beyond the standards laid out in the general Code of Conduct and Ethics, however they are
not allowed to create a more lenient Code. 153

The commissions are given the power to investigate whether a person has violated a portion of
the Code of Conduct either at its own initiative or upon receiving a complaint from a third
145

Id. §9(b)
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Id. §9(e)
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Id. §9(f)
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The full listing of duties and responsibilities spans from §§8 – 31.
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Id. §5(4). These specialized commissions are numerous and nearly all-encompassing. They include

commissions for the National Assembly, electoral commission, controller and auditor-general, public officers,
judges and magistrates, teachers, members of the armed forces, members of the National Security Intelligence
Service, as well as a catch-all for public officials who don’t fit within any other category. Id. §§3(2) – 3(11).
153

Id. §5(2)
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party. 154 If the relevant commission determines that a violation has occurred, it has the power to
issue an appropriate punishment, 155 or refer the matter to another body that has the power to
issue an appropriate punishment.

The POEA further requires that all Public Service Members issue an annual declaration of their
wealth as well as that of their families. 156 The reports must also be given within thirty days of
becoming a public officer 157and within thirty days of ceasing to be a public officer. 158 The
POEA delegates to the relevant commissions the power to demand a clarification of a person’s
wealth report if the figures are not completely disclosed or if something is omitted. 159 President
Kibaki himself submitted a declaration of his own wealth at the beginning of his Presidency in an
effort to convince all of those who work in the Kenyan government to follow suit. 160
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Id. §§35(1) – 35(2).
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Id. §36(1) (a). It is interesting to note the broad powers given to these commissions under the POEA. They are

given Legislative power through their power to enact the Code of Conduct for their particular sector. See supra note
152 and accompanying text. While there are guidelines they must follow, even these can be added on to by the
Commission or even defined further and clarified if need be under §5(2)(b) (stating that the Commission may “set
out how any requirements of the specific or general Code may be satisfied”). The Commissions are also given
judicial powers in that they can investigate and punish those found in violation of the Code they themselves created.
Public Officer Ethics Act, (2003) Cap. 183 §36(1)(a).
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Kenya President Declares his Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2003, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/30/world/world-breriefing-africa-kenya-president-declares-his-wealth.html
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These mandatory declarations of wealth have raised another constitutional issue in relation to the
right to privacy. The argument here is that a mandatory duty to disclose the assets and wealth of
oneself and one’s spouse and children are certainly in conflicts with the right to privacy.
However, the right to privacy is not explicitly laid out by the Constitution of Kenya, although it
has been determined to be an implicit right that still warrants protection. 161

Many of the issues addressed by the Public Officer Ethics Act have been recurring issues in
Kenya and go as far back as the first debates over the Prevention of Corruption Act. For
instance, §11(3) of the Public Officer Ethics Act declares that “[a] public officer may accept a
gift given to him in his official capacity but, unless the gift is a non-monetary gift that does not
exceed the value prescribed by regulation, such a gift shall be deemed to be a gift to the public
officer’s [organization].” Legislators were still debating this issue over whether public officials
should be allowed to accept gifts from constituents or members of the general public as the law
worked its way through Parliament. 162 As we saw earlier in this chapter, the definition of what

161

The right to privacy is applied in Kenyan law through its presence in the English Common Law. Anne Kiunuhe,

Kenya Urgently Needs Privacy Protection Laws, BUSINESS DAILY AFRICA, August 3, 2010. Available at
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion%20&%20Analysis/Kenya%20urgently%20needs%20privacy%20prot
ection%20laws/-/539548/969588/-/view/printVersion/-/l0esy0/-/index.html
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See e.g., Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 448

(statement by Mr. Murungi, The Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs) (stating that gifts are “[p]re-emptive
corruption” and that allowing public officeers to accept these types of gifts is preparing them to be corrupt in the
future when the favor is called in); see also, Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics
Bill, March 18, 2003, col. 493 (statement by Mr. Kipchumba) (discussing that what is a valuable gift is subjective
based on a person’s relative wealth).
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constitutes a gift and whether public officials are allowed to accept gifts was an issue in the very
first anti-corruption legislation. 163

Another long-debated issue addressed by the Public Officer Ethics Act is the problem of
harambees. 164 In this context, a harambee is a Kenyan practice of public fundraising where a
public official, community leader, business person, or government representative presides over a
public meeting to collect money from a community to help fund communal projects or to raise
money for those in need. However, over time harambees became a vehicle for corruption, with
political leaders using the collected communal funds for their own gain or for unacceptable
purposes. Against this backdrop, members of Parliament debated at length whether the practice
of harambee should be made illegal because although it had noble goals, it had become an
institution of corruption in practice. 165 The issue of harambees had also come up previously in
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See supra, notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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Public Officer Ethics Act, §11(1) (A public officer shall not preside over a harambee, play a central role in its

organization or play the role of “guest of honour.”).
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Compare, Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 20, 2003, col. 579

(statement by Mr. Muchiri) (“It is important that we are not stopped from holding Harambees . . . Harambee is there
to stay but in a properly regulated manner”) with Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer
Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 450 (statement by Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Mr. Murungi)
(comparing Kenya with other, more developed African countries such as Tanzania and Uganda where there no
longer is the practice of Harambee and recommending that it is time to move towards more organized and modern
endowment and charity systems rather than the old system of Harambee.)
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earlier debates with regard to the intention of the gift giver in determining whether corruption
was taking place. 166

Another important issue with the Public Officer Ethics Act was whether the declarations of
wealth required by the Act should be kept confidential or made available to the general public so
as to encourage transparency in the government. This was a topic much debated while the bill
was making its way through the Legislature. 167 Many Ministers were opposed to having the
declarations of wealth made available to the public. 168 However, many commentators expressed
166

Supra text accompanying notes 22-29. This issue came up in that Harambee donations, just like other gifts, are

given to politicians without any idea about whether this contribution was made with the purpose of trying to procure
a return favor later on from the public or community official. Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the
Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967, col. 964 (statement by Mr. Wariithi).
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Compare, Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 13, 2003, col. 456

(statement by Mr. M. Kariuki) (“I believe that the purpose of making public officers accountable [through the
declaration of wealth] is to ensure that members of the public are informed about what they have acquired
unlawfully) with Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 18, 2003, col.
494 (statement by Mr. Kipchumba) (fearing that a declaration of wealth provision which is made public will scare
people out of the ministry because of fears about their privacy).
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Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 18, 2003, col. 494 (statement

by Mr. Kipchumba) (fearing that a declaration of wealth provision which is made public will scare people out of the
ministry because of fears about their privacy also discussing how Kenyan society is by nature more secretive about
wealth and assets); Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Public Officer Ethics Bill, March 19, 2003, col.
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the view that it was vital that the declarations be made public. 169 The final product of the POEA
made these declarations confidential. 170 However, even this was not without controversy as
some MPs were moving for an amendment to this section not long after its enactment. 171

Another divisive issue in passing the Public Officer Ethics Act is the issue over which public
service members the act applies to. Some have argued that the POEA was discriminatory
because it targets only relatively higher-ranking public service members as having to declare
their wealth, whereas lower level clerks and constables are not required to declare their
wealth. 172 This does not seem to be in keeping with the general findings on corruption in Kenya.
In many cases, public official corruption occurs in large part because they require bribes to get
by and are unable to do so solely upon their relatively small salaries. This is often the case with
teachers for example, who are not given adequate compensation without seeking supplemental
income from bribes or alternative income such as from running businesses.
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committee on Justice and Legal Affairs chaired by Kabete MP Paul Muite has given intention to amend the two
sections to provide that the confidentiality requirement be done away with.”)
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Id. at 1.
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C) Supposed Defects in the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and their
effect on the Act in Practice

The first criticism of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act was that despite all its
efforts to give the KACC real power to fight corruption, these efforts would all be insufficient
without vesting in it some sort of prosecutorial power as well. This criticism goes back to the
failed history of the KACA. The Attorney General’s office has long dragged its feet and been
unwilling to prosecute corruption cases recommended to it by the anti-corruption bodies it
supposedly worked in concert with. 173 Because of this, it was a widely held view that without
entrenching the KACC in the Constitution or legally granting it prosecutorial powers through
other means, the body would eventually become a lame duck to investigate corruption cases
which would inevitably die out on the desk of the Attorney General. 174
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See, Donald Deya, Kenya Killing the East African Dream, Again, Mars Group Kenya Blog, March 26, 2007

available at http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org/?p=25; see also Walter Menya, AG, Police Faulted for Derailing
Mwakwere Arrest, DAILY NATION, Aug. 17, 2010 (“The National Cohesion and Integration Commission on Tuesday
faulted AG Amos Wako’s office and Matthew Iteere’s police of failing to act on its recommendations to arrest Mr.
Mwakwere . . . . Attorney General Amos Wako termed the allegations as false and without foundation.”) available
at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/978264/-/wbcldp/-/index.html.
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Good Start, but More Needs to be Done, DAILY NATION, March 27, 2009 (“KACC is a lame duck. Although, as

the PM has noted, it has conducted several graft investigations, just a few have been conclusively dealt with by the
courts. The perennial problem of missing files at the courts, the delays in handling cases, questionable rulings, and
unholy cartels of lawyers and judges have conspired to frustrate the rule of law.”); see also Bernard Namunane,
Kenya: AG Fails to Act on 36 Corruption Cases, AllAfrica.com, Nov. 19, 2004.
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This criticism is most vivid in light of the Anglo-Leasing Scandal, possibly the most grand-scale
corruption scandal ever to have taken place in Kenya under Presidents Daniel Arap Moi and
Mwai Kibaki. The Anglo-Leasing Scandal involved eighteen security-related contracts the
Kenyan Government entered into during both the Moi and Kibaki Presidencies. 175 In all, it has
been estimated that the government had entered into questionable contracts in which it agreed to
pay Kshs. 56.3 billion. 176 The contracts were questionable because the Kenyan government
either grossly overpaid for the goods it requested or even because it contracted with companies
that turned out to be non-existent and never delivered on the services they were paid for. 177 Even
worse, the payments could not be revoked on the grounds that the companies did not perform
their obligations because the Kenyan government issued their money in the form of irrevocable
promissory notes. 178

This scandal was uncovered by a senior government official, John Githongo. 179 He revealed in
his report (“Githongo Report”) in extensive detail that some high-level government officials had
perpetrated this scheme. 180 The government officials had used their positions in government to
175
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Steve Bloomfield, Report Reveals Scale of Corruption in Kenya, The Independent U.K., Sept. 1, 2007, available

at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/report-reveals-scale-of-corruption-in-kenya-401113.html;
Githongo’s position was created by the NARC government upon President Kibaki’s inauguration. See Supra “The
2002 Election and the Rise of the NARC Party.”
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enter contracts on behalf of the government with fictitious companies. These contracts were paid
out by the government over a period of years and the amount spent was in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. In return the government received either nothing or vastly inadequate
services in relation to the amount the Kenyan government paid. Furthermore, because the
contracts were generally security-related, military contracts, the scheme was even more
airtight. 181 The government could contract out for exorbitant sums without disclosing what
exactly they were getting and without any checks or balances on whether they were paying a fair
price because the matters were related to national security. 182 Through these contracts, they
embezzled enormous amounts of government money for personal gain. Githongo’s report
revealed many high-level officials with whom he had incriminating conversations with regarding
their involvement in the scheme and their desire for him to stop investigating them. 183 Within
the Kibaki Presidency, these high-level officials included the then Vice President Moody Awori,
the Attorney General Amos Wako, the Finance Minister David Mwiriria, the Energy Minister
Kiraitu Murungi, Minister for Internal Security Chirs Murungaru, head of the KACC Aaron
Ringera and even the President himself Mwau Kibaki. 184
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effect tribal allegiances have in justifying this sort of grand corruption in the minds of the ruling elite).
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did not explicitly implicate any suspicious conversation he had with the President as it did other Ministers, the
President’s general statements advising Githongo to hold off on reporting these conversations along with the
President’s subsequent actions that seemingly implicate the President and are the reasons for many commentators
strongly believing that the President is involved; see also WRONG, supra note 181.
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There were great expectations that the NARC government was going to be clean and corruptionfree unlike its predecessor, 185 however the Anglo Leasing Scandal and the report by Githongo
tarnished the image of the NARC regime. It was due to this scandal that the Kenyan people and
the rest of the world began to realize that the NARC government was not the answer to
corruption that it had proclaimed itself to be and that the world had expected it to be. The anticorruption platform which had vaulted Kibaki into the Presidency appeared to lack sincerity as
the government has showed no commitment at all to the anti-corruption agenda. Nearly every
Minister in the Kibaki Presidency was incriminated by the Githongo Report.

The investigations into the Anglo Leasing Scandal and the futile effort to bring those responsible
to justice show an inherent weakness in the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and why it
could not be effective in its fight against corruption on its own. Even though it has been granted
broad investigatory powers, 186 the KACC did not discover any evidence of this grand corruption
until Githongo made his report public. In addition, the actions of the Attorney General strongly
suggest that he was at least complicit in the scandal, if not actively involved in its cover up
which prevented the scandal from being exposed, investigated, and its perpetrators prosecuted. 187
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As discussed above, without the AG working in concert with the KACC it becomes a lame duck,
incapable of curbing corruption in Kenya. 188 Here, the Attorney General and the Judicial Branch
hindered any attempts to investigate in a number of different ways. 189 The Attorney General
allowed the government to pay for the corrupt contracts via promissory notes. 190 The negative
effects of this were twofold. First, the government was bound to pay the contracts because the
promissory notes could not be revoked, and second, this hindered the KACC’s ability to find out
who was behind the scheme and the fictitious companies because promissory notes can change
hands numerous times as they are traded on the open market.

The judicial branch has at times rendered the KACC powerless to effectively fight corruption. In
one instance the KACC was prohibited from investigating Nedemar Technologies BV, one of the
companies that received an “Anglo-leasing” contract. The court in that case refused to allow the
KACC to investigate into a contract entered into by the Attorney General before the KACC had
come into being. 191 In another instance the KACC’s investigations into Globetel Incorporated
188

See supra note 174 and accompanying text..
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and First Mercantile Securities Corp. were not stymied by a court decision, but were certainly
hindered. 192 The Kenyan court in that case ruled that the KACC could not use any information
received from the mutual legal assistance of a foreign jurisdiction. 193

A second criticism of the KACC is that its corruption-fighting powers were still not entrenched
in the Kenyan Constitution. This was a problem that the KACA also faced during its time as the
anti-corruption body. 194 The Gachiengo decision could have been prevented had the KACA
been given a constitutional mandate. As we saw above, this was one of the proposed methods
for reviving the KACA after Gachiengo stripped it of all of its powers. 195 While KACC has so
far survived constitutional scrutiny unlike KACA, the lack of a constitutional foundation has still
left doubts regarding its powers. For instance, the power of the KACA to require those
suspected of wrongdoing to declare their property has been questioned for its constitutional
legitimacy. 196 Sections twenty-six, twenty-seven, and twenty-eight of the Anti-Corruption and
Economic Crimes Act all deal with this power the KACC has to require suspects to declare their
property. When Dr. Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru was the subject of one of these requests by
the KACC, he like many others immediately went to the court to challenge the constitutionality
of the KACC’s actions. 197 The defendant challenged the action by the KACC as being
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unconstitutional because it was in violation of the presumption of innocence and in his view had
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that his property wasn’t illegally obtained
through corrupt activities. 198 The defendant further argued that the provisions were in violation
of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and the right to silence. Defendant
Murungaru also argued that the KACC prosecution was “inhumane, demeaning, and degrading
treatment in contravention of Section 74(1) of the Constitution.”199 The Court found that the
actions of the KACC were not in violation of the Constitution,200 although, it is a perfect
example of the endless litigation the KACC has had to endure in defending its rights and
methods for fighting corruption.

This decision seems to depart from some of the other decisions of the Kenyan judiciary in that it
seems to take into account the corruption epidemic, the long fight against corruption, and the fact
that it is still widespread in Kenya. Past decisions by the Judiciary had the effect of doing away
with vital anti-corruption resources on tenuous and minute procedural grounds. 201 The
Murungaru decision seemed to recognize the importance of the KACC in the fight against
the Powers of the Commission for Detection and Investigation of Corruption and Economic Crimes in 26, 27, and
28 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 (2007).
198
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corruption and therefore defended it from some of the procedural attacks which had been
effective in stymieing anti-corruption efforts in the past. 202

Part VI. The Fight against Corruption Today

In this section I will look at more recent events, both successes and failures, in the fight against
corruption and the initiatives the government is still unveiling to try and win the war against
corruption in Kenya.

To try to solve the problems inherent with not having the body entrenched in the Constitution the
Kenyan government drafted a Revised Harmonized Draft Constitution at the end of 2009. Under
this Draft Constitution, a committee of experts proposed to firmly establish the constitutionality
of the KACC by having it expressly provided for in the Constitution. The clause would have
empowered the KACC to combat corruption without such judicial challenges.

The Anti-

Corruption Commission would have been granted powers to force the declaration of property.
This would have immunized the KACC from judicial challenges. 203

The Integrity Commission would still not have had prosecutorial powers under the Harmonized
Draft Constitution. However, there were provisions in place to protect its investigations from
being undermined by the Attorney General’s powers. Under the Harmonized Draft Constitution,
Chapter 12, Section 193, the Attorney General was to serve a six year term, at the end of which
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he is not eligible for reappointment. 204 This was very likely in response to the enduring term of
Amos Wako as Attorney General. Wako has served in this position since 1991, and is criticized
by many for his unwillingness to prosecute corruption cases brought to his desk. An
uncooperative Attorney General under such an amendment would no longer have free reign to
prevent progress in the fight of corruption and justice indefinitely. However, the Revised
Harmonized Draft Constitution of March 2010 dropped the Integrity Commission over
objections by the Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution. The Parliamentarians, in
dropping the provision, demonstrated once again their lack of commitment to removing the legal
and constitutional impediments that previously frustrated the effectiveness of the anti-corruption
agenda in Kenya. The Revised Harmonized Draft Constitution however made provision for an
independent anti-corruption agency. It contemplated that the power of the Attorney General in
conducting prosecutions was not absolute.

Another proposal to try to give the fight greater efficiency and effectiveness was the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes (Repeal) Act. 205 This proposed Act would dissolve the KACC
and make it a part of the office of the Attorney General. However, this law would have been
much less advantageous to the fight against corruption than the Harmonized and Revised
Harmonized Draft Constitutions. After all, the anti-corruption agenda has been impeded by the
204
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AG’s office much more than by the KACC. The KACC has submitted numerous cases that it
has investigated to the Attorney General’s office that have died upon his desk. Repealing the
ACECA would therefore not be much of a solution at all. Under this proposal, the AG’s office,
historically inept at fighting corruption, would be the sole coordinator for anti-corruption efforts.
The repeal would therefore be a huge step backwards. Being independent and removed from the
external, political pressure that the branches of government can apply would make it possible for
the anti-corruption agenda to be more effective. Placing the corruption agency back under the
supervision and control of the government would by contrast lead to the paralysis and
manipulation that has frustrated the agenda so far.

Keeping the KACC impartial is especially important given the recent resignation by the head of
the body, Aaron Ringera. On 30th September 2009, Ringera, the resigned from his post as anticorruption chief. Ringera had been head of the KACC and the now-defunct KACA since 1999.
His reappointment by President Kibaki in 2009 was the subject of much controversy and
eventually led to Ringera’s resignation. The issue with his reappointment was the manner in
which it was accomplished. §(9)(3) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act provides
that the Kenya Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (KAACB) will nominate a candidate for any
vacancy in the position of Director. This nominee will need to pass a vote in the National
Assembly at which point the President will appoint this person to the position. 206 In Ringera’s
reappointment, however, President Kibaki bypassed both the process of nomination by the
KACCAB and the ratification of the nomination by the National Assembly and unilaterally
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retained Ringera in Office. 207 This move by Kibaki was controversial and for the first time, the
National Assembly vetoed a Presidential order. 208 While some commentators admitted that
Ringera was still highly qualified for the job and remained the best candidate for the job, 209
many felt that he had failed in his job to help reduce and (ideally) eradicate corruption in
Kenya. 210

Whether or not Ringera had done his job or not however is a more complicated issue than just
looking at the results of the fight against corruption under his watch. The KACC had to deal
with a government where all three branches tainted with corruption, an Attorney General
unwilling to go after those responsible, apparent high-level cover ups of grand-scale corruption,
and a public sector which has treated corruption as a way of life. Clearly Ringera had not done
all he could do to rid the country of corruption. The fact that President Kibaki and his
administration, as tainted with corruption as it was, valued Ringera’s service and desired him to
remain in office is damning in and of itself. This is a large reason why, with a new head to the
KACC just beginning his term as chief in the fight against corruption, it is important that his
tenure is not influenced from the start by external, corrupting pressures.
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The new head of the KACC position –leading Nairobi lawyer Patrick Lumumba - is also
especially important because of the recent regression in the fight against corruption in the past
several years. One such example is the passage of two amendments to the ACECA that put a halt
to much of the investigation into some of the grand scale corruption. Parliament under President
Kibaki introduced two sections to the ACECA. §25(a) of the ACECA authorizes the cessation of
investigations by the head of the KACC after consulting the Attorney General and Minister for
Justice. 211 §56(b) was further inserted to allow the government not to prosecute corruption
suspects who has (1) given full disclosure of material facts of past corruption by himself or
others; or (2) refunded all of the money or property acquired through their past corruption. 212
These amnesty provisions provided valuable immunity to some key players in past instances of
governmental grand corruption which had robbed the country of millions of U.S. dollars. 213 This
is why Parliament had previously declined to pass similar legislation. 214

These provisions effectively hindered investigations into past corruption within the upper
echelons of government. This is seen in the recent corruption incident, the Grand Regency
Scandal, which involved the repayment of funds from the Goldenberg Scandal years earlier. Mr.
Pattni, one of the chief architects of Goldenberg, agreed to give the expensive Grand Regency
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Hotel he had allegedly built with Goldenberg monies over to the Kenyan government as
reimbursement for his part in the scandal. This hotel was widely valued at over $120 million, so
while this was not a full reimbursement, it was a substantial victory for the government in
retrieving funds it lost through grand corruption. On the other hand, the contract came with a
price. Having admitted to corruption and returned some of what he stole, Mr. Pattni was now
granted amnesty from future proceedings related to Goldenberg.

The Kenyan government, now with a multimillion dollar hotel in its possession sought to sell its
newly acquired asset. Finance Minister Amos Kimunya, the center of the controversy, sold the
property at a vastly deflated price and the Kenyan government only received $45 million for the
hotel, roughly 1/3 of its market price. 215 The Finance Minister also disregarded procedural
safeguards for the selling of government assets and basically made this sale unilaterally. The
Finance Minister did not even accept bids from private groups interested in buying the hotel
before he sold it at the inadequate price.

Finance Minister Kimunya’s actions led to calls for his resignation by the Attorney General
Amos Wako among others. These calls were eventually answered when Kimunya resigned in
July of 2008. 216 However, his time out of government did not last long. The President created
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the Cockar Commission to investigate the incident. 217 The Commission eventually cleared
Kimunya of any wrongdoing and stated that his public condemnation was nothing more than a
witch hunt. 218 While this is allegedly what the report from the Commission said, it cannot be
verified because President Kibaki refused to make the report public. 219 Consequently, Minister
Kimunya was controversially reinstated to his old post. 220

Mwalimu Mati, the head of the anti-corruption watchdog reporting agency Mars Group Kenya
has proclaimed the government to be as corrupt as it has been in years and likens it to the
notoriously corrupt period of Daniel Arap Moi’s presidency. 221 President Kibaki’s pledge upon
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taking office to end corruption no longer seems to be of the utmost importance to neither he nor
the rest of the government.

The President and his incumbent ministers may have even resorted to corruption to retain their
hold on Kenyan politics in the 2007 Presidential elections. In a hotly contested election between
President Mwai Kibaki and challenger Raila Odinga, both candidates ironically used an anticorruption platform as a rally point for their campaign. 222 There was huge turnout for the
election and it was easily Kenya’s most participated in election to date. 223 When the results were
unveiled Kibaki had garnered just enough votes to remain President. This is despite the fact that
Odinga had led in the polls leading up to the election and was thought of as the favorite to
win. 224 President Kibaki was alleged to have stuffed the ballot box with enough votes to retain
his position as commander in chief. His opponent even came right out and stated that Kibaki
should admit he cheated, concede defeat and resign. 225 It is also a generally accepted view in the
international community that there was at least some vote rigging and corruption in the 2007
election. 226 In the wake of the election, Kenyans turned to violence and looted and rioted with
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ethnic clashes between the Kikuyu tribe, from which must of Kibaki’s government hails, and
other tribes angry that they remained on the outside. 227 This ethnic clash in the wake of the 2007
election eventually left over a thousand Kenyans dead, 228 hundreds of thousands of Kenyan’s
displaced 229 and the country on the brink of Civil War.

The harm corrupt government officials caused these so-called “Internally Displaced Persons” or
IDP’s did not stop with the post-election violence. Corruption remained prevalent and unabated
in Kenya even after the post-election violence illuminated how fed up and angry Kenyans were
with their governments longstanding corruption. While the government spent “hundreds of
millions of shillings to find new homes for [those displaced by the post-election violence] or to
get them back to their farms,” much of this money found its way into the pockets of corrupt
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officials, rather than to those for whom it was intended. 230 Over twenty district and provincial
officials were expected to be charged with pocketing over 100 million Kenyan shillings. 231 The
officials were supposed to be compiling lists of persons who were displaced following the postelection violence. 232 However, they allegedly included fictitious names on the list and funds
distributed to these non-existent people went directly into their pockets. 233

Following the violence, a power sharing agreement was reached whereby Odinga was named to
the new post of Prime Minister and a coalition government was formed with an equal number of
ministers from Kibaki’s PNU (formerly NARC) party and Odinga’s ODM party. 234 However, it
is not clear whether this coalition government has improved Kenya’s governance much beyond
avoiding further violence.

The coalition government has already been accused of siphoning off funds from the money
allocated to aid the refugees of post-election violence. It also appears that a lot of the efforts of
the new Prime Minister and civil society in exposing high level corruption have been thwarted
by their compatriots in the government. For example, on February 13th 2010, PM Odinga
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suspended two ministers so as to pave the way for investigations into maize and free primary
education. 235 These suspensions could have also been in response to President Kibaki
suspending several ministers and aides—many of which were from Odinga’s ODM party—days
before for alleged corruption. 236 However, just days later, Kibaki blocked the suspension Odinga
had made and reinstated the two ministers claiming that such a suspension was illegal because he
had not been consulted first. 237

This kind of political infighting within the government is surely not a good sign for the future of
Kenyan government. This agreement was only brought about because of intense international
pressure to stop the violence within Kenya following the election, 238 and it appears that the two
parties, forced into working together are only out to make each other’s lives difficult. One thing
is clear, this political infighting and petty bickering within the government will only serve to hurt
the government’s fight against corruption and the Kenyan people the government is supposed to
be helping. 239
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A) New Constitution in Kenya

On August 27, 2010 the Kenyan government ratified a new constitution. 240 In ratifying it, the
government not only fortified its fight against corruption in the Constitution, but also gave the
Kenyan people hope for a future free of government looting and pillaging. 241 This constitution
was founded on principles of “good governance, integrity, transparency, and accountability. 242

While the current anti-corruption bodies remain in place for the time being, they will eventually
give way to new bodies working under a constitutional mandate. The Ethics and AntiCorruption Commission (EACC) will replace the KACC as the anti-corruption body in Kenya
once passed by Parliament. This development alone is a huge step forward for the Kenyan
government. It now has an anticorruption body constitutionally entrenched. Along with this
entrenchment comes the potential for it to have the constitutionally protected power to prosecute
corruption crimes. Section 156(7) states that “The powers of the Attorney-General may be
exercised in person or by subordinate officers acting in accordance with general or special
instructions. 243 In the same vein, the powers of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission are
set as “[able to] perform any functions and exercise any powers prescribed by legislation, in
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addition to the functions and powers conferred by the Constitution.”244 The Constitution further
provides that “Parliament may enact legislation conferring powers of prosecution on authorities
other than the Director of Public Prosecution.” 245 This means that the legislature can delegate to
the EACC the power to pursue corruption suspects in the court system, rather than having to wait
for the Attorney General to act on their governmental corruption reports – a wait that has been
exceedingly long in the past. 246 However, this is not yet the reality for the EACC.

It is imperative that Parliament confer this prosecutorial power to the EACC. Because it has not
been expressly conferred, any prosecution power at this point may be limited by a narrow
reading of the constitution. A court that has in the past relied on technicalities to defeat
corruption 247 may continue this legacy because the Constitution does not affirmatively confer to
the Commission the right to prosecute. This possibility alone is a criticism of the new Kenyan
Constitution. Given all the troubles the anticorruption commissions have had in the past trying
to punish corruption through the legal system, it would have been prudent for the drafters to
affirmatively confer the prosecutorial power to the EACC in the constitution rather than making
a conferral of this type merely permissible.

However, while not firmly settling the issue of prosecutorial power, the Kenyan Constitution did
resolve many issues with the EACC that were divisive for its predecessors.
244
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The newly ratified constitution will also retract the Public Officer Ethics Act. Again, however,
the principles of the Act have now been moved into the Constitution where they enjoy a
protection and cemented-status that they did not previously have when set out solely via an Act
of Parliament. 248 Chapter 13 lays out the values and principles of Public Service. 249 These
include:
“high standards of professional ethics; efficient, effective and economic
use of resources; responsive, prompt, effective, impartial and equitable provision
of services; involvement of the people in the process of policy making,
accountability for administrative acts; [and] transparency and provisions to the
public of timely, accurate information.” 250

This list is not exhaustive, as there are many other guidelines for government employees’
professional and personal behavior. Having these ‘high standards of professional ethics’ 251
cemented in the Constitution will make them fundamental to governmental performance and help
eradicate corruption or unethical behavior in government before it even begins.

In the past, the Public Officers Ethics Act not being embedded in the Constitution caused a great
deal of litigation over whether the Act of Parliament was constitutional. For example,
governmental officials, many of whom undoubtedly had acquired vast amounts of wealth
248
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through corrupt activities were opposed to the POEA’s mandatory declarations of wealth. 252
They fought this provision by claiming that it was unconstitutional, in violation of their right to
privacy and fought to have their assets safe from disclosure. 253 This argument is no longer
viable because the provision is now fundamentally constitutional and cannot be challenged
because it is expressly provided that these declarations must be made.

Similarly, the government now has a constitutionally-mandated requirement to be more
transparent. Not only is it provided that transparency is important and fundamental to the
government, but section 35(1) requires the mandatory publishing of certain information to the
public. 254 The Constitution states that “[e]very citizen has the right of access to – (a) information
held by the State; and (b) information held by another person and required for the exercise of any
right of fundamental freedom.” 255 This is a vital new right given to the citizens and duty
imposed on the government. In the past, many of the government contracts and affairs were kept
secret and no one knew about who exactly the government had paid to do contracts and how
much they had paid out. This was a core problem with the Anglo Leasing scandal. 256 Without a
transparent government-public relationship, not only did no one know about the Anglo Leasing
Scandal until millions of dollars had been irrevocably lost, but tracking down who it had gone to
has been an exceedingly difficult, frustrating process. To this day, the perpetrators have not been
252
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held responsible, largely because all of the government’s actions have been shrouded in mystery
because no duty to disclose information was present at the time to hold the government
transparent and accountable.

Overall, by mandating through the constitution all of these provisions and aspects of good
governance which had previously been paid only lip service, Kenya has taken a gigantic step
towards minimizing governmental corruption. The government must now follow through and
enforce the constitutional provisions of good governance that it has laid out.

The Kenyan government has already begun prosecuting high-level corruption cases more
actively. The Higher Education Minister William Ruto has been charged with fraud in the
amount of K.Sh 96 million. 257 He allegedly received the money in exchange for transferring
parcels of land belonging to the Ministry of Natural Resources to the Kenya Pipeline
Company. 258 He has been charged with three counts of abuse of office and he had his
constitutional objections rejected by a constitutional court. 259 This is especially notable because
these are cases that date back to the prior constitution; cases that were stopped by the
constitutional court before Ruto and the other ministers could be held accountable for their
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actions. 260 This may have been the first showing from the Kenyan government that the days of
unaccountable, corrupt ministers are over.

Days after the constitutional court held that Mr. Ruto would face the fraud charges, President
Kibaki suspended the minister. 261 Under §62 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act,
however, the Minister will continue to be paid half his full time salary pending resolution of the
case. 262 This has led to calls for him to resign from the public, Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo,
and Gichugu MP Martha Karua. 263 Mr. Ruto has dismissed these calls for resignation and
asserts that these charges are nothing more than a political ploy to get him out of office. 264

MP Ruto was not the only Minister to have his actions come under increased scrutiny following
the new Constitution’s passage. Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetang’ula and Permanent
Secretary Thuita Mwangi were questioned before Parliament for their role in procuring Kenya’s
missions abroad – procurements in which tax-payers allegedly lost millions of shillings. This
scandal involved Kenyan missions in multiple countries. Property was purchased in Japan for a
Kenyan embassy for K.Sh 1.75 billion when the property was later valued at a mere K.Sh 400
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million.265 This purchase was made without the proper input of other departments; departments
which would have been able to make a proper evaluation of the property’s value. 266 The
embassy in Pakistan was to cost K.Sh 366 million.267 However, twice the estimate was
increased until the price stood at K.Sh 523. 268 Not only that, but the project currently stands at
only 40% complete despite the increased payment and it appears that construction has halted. 269
Much of the money paid to buy the embassy in Egypt could not be accounted for. 270 There have
even been discrepancies for embassies being built in Europe as well. The Kenyan embassy in
Belgium was estimated to cost 3 million euros; however, an extra 850,000 euros was spent on
second-hand furniture that has proven to be impractical and unnecessary. 271 These stories of
excess and graft in the Foreign Affairs Ministry go on and on and thankfully resulted in MP
Wetang’ula’s resignation. 272 The MP blamed civil servants for these corrupt transgressions and
claimed his own innocence by saying ministers deal with policy and civil servants are the ones
charged with transacting business with these other nations. 273
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It is procurements such as these that were denounced in J.M. Migai Akech’s article Development
Partners And Governance of Public Procurement in Kenya: Enhancing Democracy in the
Administration of Aid. 274 Procurements, the “principal means for through which governments
meet developmental needs” present a problem because the discretionary nature of such
procurements enables the government to get away with illicitly transferring funds from the
government to the private sector. 275 The discretion to award government contracts in developing
countries continues to be used as a vehicle for political patronage. 276 This is especially true in
developing countries where there is a huge amount of aid flowing into the countries for
assistance in government reform and improvement.

In the context of Kenya, 60% of government revenue is spent on procurements. There are huge
flaws in the Kenyan procurement framework, problems which are prevalent in developing
countries throughout the world. These problems prevent the government from properly
distributing the aid and providing the services citizens. This is in part because public officers are
immunized from lawsuits against them in their personal capacity for any contracts they enter into
on behalf of the government. 277 The system is therefore ripe for abuse. This is apparent MP
Wetang’ula’s resignation. He and the civil servants under him are not personally liable for the
hundreds of millions of Kenyan shillings they cost the Kenyan people.
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Secondly, Kenyan public servants are allowed to participate in private enterprises, there is
therefore a huge conflict of interest when procurements are sought and there are firms bidding
for it that are owned or invested in by the public servants making the decision! 278 In the same
vein, a lack of transparency in the procurement system prevents public investigation and
oversight to prevent corrupt contracts from being entered into. 279 Without transparency there is
even less accountability in the procurement process.

The Anglo-Leasing scandal is illustrative of these problems. Public servants and ministers
reaped enormous financial benefits from the Anglo-Leasing contracts. Without any services
actually being provided from the procurement money, they were able to pocket a huge portion of
the money the government contracted to pay out for the goods and services. Furthermore, it took
a great deal of time for the scandal to be discovered. The government is still uncovering more
anglo-leasing type contracts and by the time it discovered the main corrupt procurement
contracts, the money had been paid and was probably irrevocably lost. This is a perfect example
of how a lack of transparency in the procurement process breeds corruption.

It is true that some of these deficiencies in the procurement process have been fixed since Anglo
Leasing and other instances exposed the flaws in the system. As Akech points out, the creation
of the Public Procurement Complaints. Review and Appeals Board injected some oversight and
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accountability into the procurement system. 280 However, the administrative oversight is still not
strong as it could be to prevent one of the most expensive forms of graft from taking place. For
example, by preventing the Board from entertaining complaints after the procurement contract
has been concluded, many instances of graft have been unreviewable and therefore unsolved. 281
Thus, although improvements have been made and frameworks are now better suited to deal with
and prevent grand corruption, it is readily apparent that merely maintaining the status quo will
not be enough to prevent corruption effectively.

While the new anti-corruption framework has not been put into place, the passage of the
Constitution has ushered in a new era in the fight against corruption. The government’s tough
stance on corruption has been made clear in public speeches as well. PM Raila Odinga called
out the Kenyan government to not make corruption acceptable behavior. 282 Speaking at the
opening of a hotel, PM Odinga stated that “We have identified corruption as a menace we have
to deal with if we are to surge ahead, and we are facing it head on.” 283 Furthermore, President
Kibaki spoke about corruption after the resignation of MP Wetang’ula. 284 The President stated
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“A person who plans to misuse public funds must not be allowed to continue
working in Government. We must deal with those who want to embezzle public
money... we will sack such fellows. Those who want to continue working on ways
to steal public money should go home and let the new crop of professionals
develop the country.” 285

Such statements were oftentimes made hollowly and to appease the donors and public
sympathies in the past. However, here, coupled with the government’s actions in passing a new
Constitution and going after corrupt ministers, the words no longer nearly ring as hollow as
before. If there is one thing we have learned through this long fight against corruption, it is that
anti-corruption efforts will never be truly successful absent individual and government-wide
commitment to truly cease having corruption be a way of life.
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Conclusion
Kenya has had a long path in seeking to combat corruption. From its initial narrowly focused
efforts at defining corruption to the broad-based institutional efforts it undertook as discussed in
this paper. The latest turn in this journey is the August 2010 Constitution ratified
overwhelmingly in a referendum. This Constitution entrenches a new Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission and embeds within it the ethical and professional guidelines of the Public Officers
Ethics Act. The government is also now constitutionally required to be based on the principles of
transparency and accountability. It also requires the mandatory publishing and making public
access of information held by the State – such disclosure is likely to encourage more open,
transparent and accountable government. If followed, the commands of the new Constitution are
therefore likely to end the secrecy that made corruption rampant and pervasive to date. A new
Chairman of the Kenya Anticorruption Commission and a judicial decision from a constitutional
court dismissing an application to bar the prosecution of a cabinet minister who has recently
resigned may be the first signs of a new turn in Kenya’s renewed efforts to combat corruption.
Another cabinet minister has also resigned to pave way for investigations.

However, it is too early to tell what the future holds. Almost every turn made to combat
corruption in Kenya has been suffered setbacks –because the judiciary was unsympathetic to the
broader anticorruption agenda or because Parliament or the Executive branch found ways to
cover-up corrupt behavior. Further, a lot of the old corrupt guard remains in the government.
These challenges remain even under the new Constitution.
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